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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARKING METER ORDINANCES
During the last several years the increased complexity of city traffic
has resulted in the appearance of parking meter ordinances in many
American cities, including several in Ohio. A meter, authorized by an
ordinance of this type, is placed at the side of each parking space and
automatically indicates, upon the deposit of a five-cent coin by the motor-
ist, the duration of the period of legal parking. These meters serve the
dual function of efficiently aiding police officers in relieving congestion in
the downtown areas and at the same time of offering a substantial source
of revenue for city treasuries.
Two courts of last resort' and an appellate court' have upheld the
validity of an ordinance of this type. One supreme court3 has declared
such an ordinance to be unconstitutional. Several advisory opinions on
this question have also been rendered.'.
What are the constitutional questions that arise in connection with
these ordinances? They may be said to be four in number. I. Does the
ordinance constitute a proper exercise of the taxing power? 2. May the
collection of the five-cent fee be justified as a police regulatory measure?
3 and 4. Are the rights of the traveling public or the abutting property
owner improperly restricted or appropriated?
TAXING POWER
By virtue of the Home Rule provision in the Ohio Constitution' it
may be said at the outset that cities in this state possess much broader
legislative powers than cities in many other jurisdictions. Under this
provision it has been held that the charter cities have full power of
taxation in those fields not already occupied by the state.' This includes
the authority to levy excise taxes.7
The license fee collected from the operator of a motor vehicle is
held to be an excise tax.' If the exaction authorized by the parking
meter ordinances is held to be an excise tax it does not appear objection-
able on the ground that it is an entrance by the municipality into a field
'State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, iz6 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); Ex parte
Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 Pac. (zd) 105 (937).
2 Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, (Tex. Civ. App.), 105 S.W. (zd) 743 (937)"
'Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson. Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 17z So. I4 (1937).
4lIn re Opinion of the Justices--Mass.-, 8 N.E. (zd) 179 (1937)i Opinion of
the Attorney General of Ohio, No. 5750 (1936).
'Art. XVIII, S. 3-
'State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. zzo, 14. N.E. 134 (919); Marion
Foundry Co. v. Landes, ixz Ohio St. i66, 147 N.E. 302 (19z5); Cincinnati v. Amer.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 11z Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E. 8o6 (xgz5); Firestone v. City of Cambridge,
113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (19z5).
7 Idem.
a Saviers v. Smith, 1o1 Ohio St. 132, 128 N.E. z69 (19zo).
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that is already occupied by the state. Although a city may not levy an
excise tax on motor vehicles because of this objection9 yet a tax of the
nature under discussion is apparently a tax on the privilege of parking.
If it is a tax the requirement that there be reasonable classification
must be met. Although this problem is present in practically all taxation
legislation yet the courts have enunciated but vague standards.'" That
automobile operators may be taxed as a class is well settled in Ohio."
Whether the sub-classification of taxing only those who enjoy the park-
ing privilege is proper would seem to admit of no doubt. In the case of
1l/len v. Pullman's Palace Car Co.'3 the statement is made that, "Any
occupation, business, employment, or the like, affecting the public, may
be classed and taxed as a privilege." The most serious objection in this
case is that not all those who park are subject to the tax. It is only
those who do so in the downtown areas. In the fourth edition of Cooley
on Taxation it is said, "The rules as to classification are the same with-
out regard to whether the imposition is a tax or is a mere exercise of the
police power."" It must be admitted that a city, under its police regu-
latory powers, may deal with parking and traffic in downtown areas to
the exclusion of that in the outlying districts.' 4 Thus, if the above quoted
statement be correct, it must be conceded that no attack of "unreason-
able classification" could be made on these ordinances. This appears
reasonable. Although no authority was cited in support of the statement,
an argument may be made in its favor. The police power of the state
may only be exercised in those fields bearing in some substantial degree
on the health, morals, safety, or general welfare of the public. This is
not true of tax legislation and the latter, although it may include in its
operation the subjects of the former field, is not restricted thereby
and may enter into other areas that clearly would not be proper subjects
of police regulation. It is only in the area where the taxation and the
police power may both be exercised that the statement by Mr. Cooley
in his work on taxation would be valuable. The test for determining
the proper classification of subjects over which the police power may be
exercised are fairly well defined. It appears that as the resulting groups
do clearly affect the public in a peculiar fashion this fact should bear
strongly on the question whether the state, in selecting them for taxation
Firestone v. City of Cambridge, supra, note 6.
a, Thomas Reed Povwell, "Supreme Court Condonations and Condemnations of Dis-
criminatory State Taxation, 19zz-i9z5" iz Va. L. Rev. 441 and 546 (19z6).
Supra, note 8.
1 91 U.S. 171, Z4 Sup. Ct. 9, 48 L.Ed. 134 (1903).
134 Cooley, Taxation, sec. x685.
"In re John Corvey, zzo Mo. App. 6o (19z6)5 Pepole's Rapid Transit Co. v.
Atlantic City, 1o5 N.J.L. z86, 144 At. 630 (19z9)i State v. Carter, zo5 N. Car. 761,
172 S.E. 415 (1934).
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purposes has acted arbitrarily. It is significant that the subject of parking
does fall within this class. 5
POLICE POWER
If it were held that this fee is not justifiable under the taxing power
of the municipality there is still open the avenue of its being valid as an
exercise of the police power. It is upon this ground that the measure has
been upheld in the three jurisdictions to which reference has already been
made.'" It is well recognized that under the police regulatory powers
fees may be exacted from individuals who themselves are, or who own
property that is, subject to the regulation imposed.' The sum collected,
however, must be for the purpose of and must not, to an unreasonable
extent, exceed the amount necessary to properly inspect and regulate.
The rule is stated in the case of Prudential Co-operative Realty Co. v.
Youngstown."
"Where the authority is lodged in the municipality to inspect and
regulate, the further authority to charge a reasonable fee to cover the
cost of inspection and regulation will be implied. The fee charged must
not, however, be grossly out of proportion to the cost of inspection and
regulation; otherwise it will operate as an excise tax, * * *. It is not to
be expected that fees can be charged which will exactly balance the cost
and expense, and a reasonable excess will not operate to invalidate the
ordinance."
In an excellent note appearing in 22 Iowa Law Review 713 (1937)
entitled "Parking and the Constitutionality of 'Parking Meter' Or-
dinances", in which the whole problem is critically discussed, several
salient figures appear. It is there stated that in a survey made in 1936
of the 26 cities using the traffic meter, the average income per meter
was between 40 and 5o cents a day; the number of meters in a given
city ranging up to 2ooo. This would indicate that in a city using
IOOO meters the yearly revenue from them would total approximately
$150,000. What are the expenses incidental to their operation?
Witchita Falls, Texas, paid $58.oo per meter completely installed and
placed in operation.' This initial cost of operation is large but, as can
be seen, does not approach the amount annually collected. The amount
expended to properly supervise the operation of the meters would neces-
sarily be small. Indeed, it may be added, although perhaps without legal
15 See, however, Sholley, "Equal Protection in Tax Legislation," 24. Va. L. Rev. zZ9
(1938).
1" Supra, notes i and z.
"7 Daily v. City of Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281, 77 S.W. (2d) 939 (1935); Aberdeen-
Franklin Coal Co. v. Chicago, 315 Ill. 99, x45 N.E. 613 ('9z4.); Lee v. State, x63 Ga.
Z39, 135 S.E. 91z (1976).
28 118 Ohio St. 204, x6o N.E. 695 (igzS).
" Supra, note 2.
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significance, that if the meters efficiently register the parking irregulari-
ties that fewer officers are thus needed in this line of work than was the
case before the meters appeared. It cannot be supposed that these
expenses would, to any considerable degree, devour the sum produced
by the meters. One could argue that since these parking ordinances are
so intimately tied up with the traffic situation in all of its phases that the
amount collected could be expended on traffic regulation in general,
although it is doubtful whether such a view would be sustained.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the municipality had no
thought of revenue in mind when it passed the ordinance but that the
parking meters actually became a very lucrative enterprise, would this
latter fact in itself render the ordinance invalid? In the great majority
of cases involving fees imposed under the police power there are no
facts to show the relation between the amount collected and the amount
needed to cover the cost of administration. Under these circumstances
it is the universal attitude, unless the fee is unreasonable or prohibitory
per s," '' to uphold the ordinance. 2' This is on the ground of lack of
evidence, however, and does not answer our question. Two arguments
are submitted in support of the exaction of this fee in spite of its profit
making character.
The first is that the fee could arguably be said to be reasonable
ter se. To the person paying the fee, the very fact that it is but five cents
might be entitled to some weight. The most important point, however,
is that a five-cent piece is, practically speaking, the lowest amount that
can be collected with convenience and at the same time successfully
accomplish the purpose in view. The purpose, of course, is to relieve
congestion and to keep traffic moving in the downtown areas. A one-
cent exaction, in addition to perhaps being too small to raise the inci-
dental expenses, might be the means of providing all day parking for
some persons. It seems, therefore, that if the city must choose between
having parking meters with the accompanying five-cent fee and retain-
ing the old system of marking tires with chalk it should be allowed the
former choice in spite of the facts that large sums are collected.
It must be remembered that the above arguments were all advanced
on the assumption that the city had no thought of revenue in mind when
the ordinance was passed. However, statements contained in the case
of Harper v. City of TVichita Falls" would indicate that the revenue
"" Bryan v. Malvcrn, zz Ark. 379, i8 3 S.W. 957 (1916); Mofftt v. City of Pueblo,
59 Colo. 112, 133 Pac. 754 (1913); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 8S Ark. 509,
1o9 S.W. z93, z6 L.R.A. (N.S.) I03S (19o8); Gaynor v. Roll, 79 N.J.L. 40z, 75 Atl.
179 (I9io); Condon v. Forest Park, z7S Ill. zS, xxg N.E. 8zS, L.R.A. 1917E, 314
(1917); Margolics v. Atlantic City, 67 N.J.L. 8z, So AtL 367 (19oi).
='The best examples of this attitude are found in the cases upholding the parking
meter odrinances. Supra, notes x and z.2' Supra, note 2.
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feature of the plan is a real motivating factor in its installation. The fact
that gains are to be made and that this is anticipated by the city officials
should not invite the holding that the ordinance is invalid. As stated in
I Cooley on Taxation, 67 ( 4 th Ed.): "So far as states are concerned,
impositions or charges for the primary purpose of regulation rather than
revenue are held to be an exercise of the police power rather than the
power to tax." In the cases involving the parking meters the courts
have assumed and stated that the validity and the reasonableness of the
fee must be determined by the total amount collected. This view may
be questioned if it may be found that the fee itself is reasonable and that
the ordinances actually are primarily for regulatory purposes. To de-
termine the purpose of this ordinance by its effect, which is presumed
to be the production of large revenues, is to overlook the fact that it
also provides for regulation and that there perhaps is no choice between
the two.
RIGHTS OF THE TRAVELING PUBLIC
In the decision of the Alabama court in which a parking meter
ordinance was held invalid23 it was said: "We have indicated that the
municipality holds the locus in quo, not only for the municipality and its
citizens, but in trust for the public at large, whose rights are not depend-
ent upon acts of omission or commission of the city-that is, that noth-
ing done or omitted to be done in the allowance of the unlawful
obstructions on the street, which interfere with the use within the dedi-
cation of that highway, will estop the public or those with special interest
from having the same removed as a nuisance."
In view of this statement it seems necessary, in this connection, to
determine the rights that the traveling public may assert in the highways.
It is commonly stated that when land is dedicated by grant to the
public for highway purposes or is taken by the public under its right of
eminent domain that the owner retains the fee; the public acquiring a
mere easement or right of way on the land over which it passes with the
powers and privileges incident to that right.24 In jurisdictions or under
circumstances where it is held that the fee vests in the public it is also
stated that this fee is held by the public in trust to answer the purposes
of the use. 5 The uses that may be made of the highway by the public
are the same in each case.26
2 2 Supra, note 3.
"
4 Palative v. Krueger, izi I1. 72 (887); Phifer v. Cox, zi Ohio St. 248 (1871)
State ex rel. v. Drainage District, 269 Mo. 444 (i936); State ex rel. v. N. Y. Ry. Co.,
217 N.Y. 310 (3936); Railroad Co. v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 268 (IS 7 8); McClelland
v. Miller, z8 Ohio St. 488 (876).
2 City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Coo. 113, z Pac. 6 (i883)i Cincinnati and S. Ry.
Co. v. Cuammingsville, 14 Ohio St. 523 (3863).2 Cincinnati and S. Ry. Co. v. Cammingsville, supra, note 25.
Parking has been defined as the "permitting a vehicle to stand in the
street longer than necessary to receive or discharge passengers or load or
unload merchandise." 2 Generally, as against other members of the
traveling public, this parking right is an incident of the right to travel as
long as it is exercises in a reasonable manner.28 Although many state-
ments can be found to the effect that the right and easement of the
public in the highway is to a free and unobstructed use of the full width
of the street yet the point under consideration has been obstructions
placed in the street by third parties or an unreasonable use of the high-
ways by vehicles attempted to be justified under the parking privilege.2"
Thus, if parking ordinances, of which the parking meter ordinances
are a type, are said to be a grant by the city of permission to the motorist
to park, then as against the traveling public, the city is only allowing the
motorist to do that which is already his privilege or right. In a sense, the
terms of the ordinance become the standard for the determination of
the existence of a nuisance. There is no longer any dispute concerning
the power of the municipality, in the exercise of its police power, to limit
the legal time of parking in congested areas or even to prohibit parking
entirely."0 The only requirement is that the ordinance must be reason-
ably calculated to promote safety or relieve congestion. If, under the
parking meter ordinances, the exaction of the five-cent fee is recognized
as being incidental to the exercise of the police power, as discussed above,
then it seems logical to conclude that no valid objection may be made by
members of the traveling public.
RIGHTS OF ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER
The right of the abutting property owner in the street is generally
held to include the right to air, light, view, ingress and egress; the
latter commonly being called the right to access to the premises. Parking
meter ordinances do two things that at least arguably could be the legal
basis for complaint by the owner. (I) They might be said to permit
parking in front of one's property and (2) also because of the fee
charged the public is encouraged to park elsewhere, thus indirectly
tending to harm an owner's business.
The incorporeal right which an abutting owner has in the street next
his property is best explained by the words of the court in the case of
Reining v. N. Y., L. & TV. Ry Co."' There it was said: "What then,
" Decker v. Goddard, z5x N.Y.S. 440, 233 App. Div. 139 (1931)-
"'Pugh v. City of Des loines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 NAV. 89 z (1956); Decker v.
Goddard, supra, note 275 Allen and Reed v. Presbrey, So R.I. S3, 144 At. 888 (1929).
"'Mann v. Groom, 23x N.Y.S. 342, 133 Misc. Rep. 26o (1927); Pugh v. City of
Des Moines, supra, note 28; City of Neenah v. Krueger, 2o6 Wis. 473, 24o N.W. 403
(1932).
" Cases cited supra, note 14.
31 13 N.Y.S. z38 (189).
203COMMENTS
LAW JOURNAL -MARCH, 1938
is the quality, and what are the dimensions, of that peculiar proprietary
right which belongs to him by virtue of his ownership of the abutting lot
of land? It would seem to be something given from necessity of justice
for the sake of continual beneficial enjoyment of his estate. * That
easement of access cannot be the mere right of going out from his home
or place of business upon the street and returning therefrom upon his
own land, which he may do by virtue of his personal liberty. But does
not the right of access mean a certain convenience in the use of property
with respect to the rest of the world? If the land owner is a trader, an
hotel keeper, a manufacturer, is not his easement somewhat commen-
surate with the uses to which his property is devoted. * * * Public roads
are created for the business and social reciprocity of all those whose
dwellings and establishments everywhere border upon them. The ease-
ment or right of access would seem to include the opportunity for a
man's customers to come to his place of business without unreasonable
hindrance or interference."
The question that necessarily follows is whether the parking meter
ordinances deprive an abutting owner of the rights mentioned above.
The only apparent distinction between this type of an ordinance and
ordinary parking regulations is the exaction of a five-cent fee. If by the
paying of this fee a motorist is entitled by the city, as of right, to park as
against the abutting owner then difficulty is met in justifying this action
in view of the language of the court quoted above. The attitude of the
courts in relation to this problem is well summarized by statements made
in the case of Allen & Reed v. Presbrey :3 "If the public understands
these signs to be an invitation to park for the maximum time printed
thereon, that is because of a misinterpretation of the ordinance. The
purport of the ordinance and the traffic signs is to announce that the
city, in the exercise of its power to regulate traffic, will not punish stop-
ping for a time longer. than the maximum limit. A parking ordinance
is nothing more than a police regulation which settles the matter between
the owner of the automobile and the city."
That was a case instituted by the owner of abutting property who
claimed that the creation of parking zones gave the public the right to
park in front of his premises and thus was contrary to the common law
rule mentioned above. The exaction of the five-cent fee, being but an
incident to the ordinary type ordinance, could hardly be argued to be
an attempt to enlarge the substantive right of the motorist.
Does the placing of the meters themselves on the curbline constitute
an unauthorized use of the highway of which the abutting owner could
complain? Inasmuch as this individual holds the fee, or an easement
82 5o R.I. S3, 144 At. 888 (1929).
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in the street, in strict subordinance to the rights of the traveling public it
would seem to follow that if the ordinances themselves were reasonable
exercises of the police power then the placing of the meters would be a
reasonable means of effectuating the objects sought. Reference may be
made to markers of state or national highway systems," or even purely
ornamental pieces." It is doubtful whether the Alabama Court would
disagree with this reasoning although its reference to the right of the
owner not "* * * to have his property defaced by superimposed obstruc-
tions, barriers, or parking meters placed alongside" encouraged the
mention herein made.3"
PHILIP J. WOLF
RIGHT OF PRIVATE ELECTRIC UTILITY TO ATTACK THE CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF A GRANT OF FUNDS TO A LOCAL SUB-
DIVISION TO BE USED TO CONSTRUCT A COMPETING POWER
PLANT
The Alabama Power Company brought suit against Harold L.
Ickes, as Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works, to enjoin
the loan and grant of federal funds to a municipality to be used for the
erection of an electric plant which would operate in competition with
petitioner's electric system. The Supreme Court, in affirming decisions
of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and the
District Court, held that the loss to the petitioner was the result of
lawful competition by the municipality and as such, damnum absque in-
jura giving petitioner no standing in court to contest the constitutionality
of the loan and grant. Alabama Power Company v. Harold L. Ickes,
etc. et. al., 301 U.S. 681, 82 L. Ed. 263 (938), U.S. Law Week.,
Jan. 4, 1938, p. 3, affirming 91 Fed. (2d) 303 (1937).
The important question raised by this decision may be simply stated.
When A is injured by the lawful acts of B does A have an action against
C who was the instigator of B's acts? Several different situations are
possible.
First: If C's action in inducing B to act is lawful and unaccom-
panied with an intention to injure A, it is apparent that A would have
no recourse against C. The owner of a grocery would have no legal
rights against the bank that loaned money to his competitor whereby he
was forced out of business. Second: Where C's action is intended to
"
3Scars v. Hopley, 103 Ohio St. 46, 132 N.E. z5, 16 A.L.R. 925 (1921).
" Thomkins v. Hodgson, z Hun. (N.Y.) 146 (1874).
C Supra, note 3.
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